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INTRODUCTION: AUTOCRACY, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT  
For several decades, development policy specialists and donor agencies have 
championed investment in the judicial systems of developing countries to promote 
economic growth and, eventually, democracy.  The assumption of a causal link among 
these three phenomena motivates donors’ investments in the physical and human capacity 
of the legal system. Some reforms are narrowly focused—better enforcement of property 
rights and contract law—conducive to enhanced trade and investment.   Although these 
narrow reform programs imply that political liberalisation is an ultimate objective, studies 
are unable to substantiate causality between the rule of law, economic growth and 
democracy [Carothers (2003)]. Autocratic regimes may establish courts to protect the 
property rights of regime insiders and to expropriate the rights of outsiders.  
In our view a rule of law will have emerged only once the state has achieved 
legitimacy in the hearts and minds of citizens. The idea that better rule of law would 
generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic 
reforms will be questioned in this paper.  An alternative view will be suggested, most 
notably the alignment of national identity with the institutions of the state is critical to 
establishing a rule of law.   
  
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COURTS ACCORDING 
TO REGIME TYPE 
  The consequences of judicial independence for resource distribution will vary 
according to regime type. A judicial system and with it judicial politics can be used as a 
tool to enhance political survival of leaders, within authoritarian regimes just as in 
democratic ones.  Courts may help reduce costs of commercial transactions for private 
citizens in both contexts.  Democratic leaders face incentives to provide such protection 
broadly, as with the SEC regulations on investment in the U.S.  In contrast, autocrats face 
incentives to provide selective benefits that maximise control over economic activity.12 
An effective legal system depends on coordination with other state functions, which are 
also politically controlled. Impartial judgment by the courts depends on appropriate 
police work for evidence gathering, and enforcement of decisions after the court has 
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ruled.  Both political and administrative complexities can interfere with the court’s 
independence and credibility in enforcing the law.  Insufficient notification of procedural 
changes, inconsistent interpretation of regulatory requirements, and insufficient 
enforcement of licensing requirements are just some of the bureaucratic processes that 
can undermine the court’s role in advancing commercial law. 
Court functions that we associate with facilitating economic growth—attracting 
capital, enforcing contracts, helping to build a revenue base, and maintaining bureaucratic 
discipline—are applied selectively in order to reward the winning coalition. The 
preferential or discretionary enforcement of property rights may still generate observable 
growth, but surpluses are not distributed evenly.  This is a critical difference between the 
applications of jurisprudence in democratic societies versus autocratic ones:  the more 
surplus an autocrat generates, the more she can pay off critical supporters that will 
maximise her tenure in office.   
In a democratic system, a large pool of citizens has input into the process by which 
leaders are chosen.  This set is called the “selectorate” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
[BDM (2003)].  A subset of the selectorate actually chooses the leader; this group is the 
“winning coalition,” consisting of the ruler and allies such as the military and other 
instruments of power. The selectorate potentially has access to the benefits that are 
distributed by the leader.  Both the selectorate and the winning coalition are large in 
democratic societies, in contrast to small winning coalitions in autocratic regimes, in 
which the winning coalition is small.  With a small winning coalition, the leader has an 
incentive to provide allies with private goods (or targeted public goods) in exchange for 
political loyalty, at the expense of evenly distributed public goods.  Inequality works to 
the advantage of the autocrat as membership in the winning coalition becomes more 
valuable.  The most durable autocracies have a small winning coalition with a large 
selectorate, because members of the winning coalition have more to lose if they do not 
support the ruler grows over time as the ruler learns the price for which loyalty can be 
secured; the personal wealth of those with connections to leadership increases as loyalty 
becomes cheaper to purchase. 
 Growth in autocratic regimes therefore has a very different effect than growth in 
democratic systems.  Democratic rulers have strong incentives to promote growth in 
order to provide public goods inclusively to the selectorate and general population.  If a 
democratic leader fails to provide public goods, she may be removed from office.  For the 
autocrat who has secured a solid base of support, the reciprocal arrangements between the 
state and the winning coalition do not require economic growth to be sustained. 
Sometimes better economic performance in certain sectors may work to the advantage of 
the winning coalition, but often corruption and economic inefficiency increase as the 
autocrat becomes more politically entrenched.   
Contrary to Mancur Olsen’s “stationary bandit” argument [Olson (1993)] that an 
autocrat’s political security is directly tied to growth, autocrats who promote broadly 
distributed economic development may actually see their tenure in office decline because 
the interests of society are at odds with those of the ruler.  Instead of providing a larger 
revenue stream to an autocrat, growth may instead help enemies of the regime or weaken 
regime stalwarts.  Either way, growth conceived as a public good can weaken the 
incumbent.  The interests of leadership and those of the population are often not in 
alignment and autocratic regimes offer few mechanisms to correct that misalignment.   
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 Court systems in authoritarian regimes, like other institutions in large 
selectorate-small winning coalition systems, are arranged to benefit a winning coalition 
and maximise the private wealth and political staying power of the autocrat.  We will 
explore the political motivations for leaders of authoritarian regimes to favour 
independent judiciaries in the context of the authoritarian ruler’s incentive to maintain 
discretion over what the courts can and cannot do, according to the strategy for political 
endurance.  Autocratic leaders often have expensive political agendas, the pursuit of 
which requires substantial financial means.  Their agenda can include conflicts with 
neighbouring states, the desire to accumulate personal wealth, and the need to bribe elites 
to buy their support.  Among the economic, financial and managerial dilemmas faced by 
autocrats that can motivate the creation of court systems are a need to attract investors, 
lack of revenue and failing credibility with regard to loan repayment, and failing central 
authority due to the inherent contradictions within hierarchical organisations and the 
private exploitation of information by regime representatives at lower levels. 
An independent judiciary can serve different functions according to a leader’s 
quest for political survival, a perspective which is different from the traditional argument 
that relates judicial independence to the rise of democratic polities.  Even when 
democratic and autocratic regimes employ the same institutions they have different 
effects on political rents, corruption and aggregate economic activity.  Both democratic 
and authoritarian regimes require judicial independence for legitimacy, but the 
distribution of benefits that result from that legitimation differs according to the 
constitution of the ruler’s support base and their strategy for political survival. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO AN AUTOCRAT’S  
MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 
Authoritarians face three peculiar managerial dilemmas by virtue of the ‘above the 
law status’ enjoyed by the head of state.  That status limits the effectiveness of the state 
and its institutions because it implies the primacy of discretion over rules.  Building a 
court system restricts executive discretion but instead of weakening the regime it can 
actually help to establish a stable framework for regime longevity.   First, autocrats 
require investment and therefore must create a legal system to facilitate transactions.  
Second, they need to enhance revenue collection and credit, therefore they need a legal 
framework that holds financial intermediaries accountable for their private debts and for 
dealing equitably with citizens.  Third, they need to ferret out disobedience and non-
compliance by subordinates; a legal system that discloses the abuses of officials enhances 
the leader’s renown and ensures greater compliance from citizens.  Administrative courts 
can make the state’s administrative apparatus work more smoothly to ensure that 
information about performance and malfeasance is uncovered.  Improved loyalty of 
administrative personnel is thereby attained along with a more contented populace.  
 
DILEMMA 1. Property Rights and Securing Investment Opportunities for 
Distribution to Loyalists 
The centre of the legal reform agenda for liberalisation is predictability in the 
enforcement of property rights and contracts more generally.  Development practitioners 
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and political economists often refer to the mandate for secure property rights as “policy 
stability”—investors should be confident that a country’s policies regarding protection of 
assets will remain stable, and that their assets will not be confiscated.  Hernando de Soto 
(2000) and others have emphasised the importance of property rights reform, assuming 
an empirical correlation between rule of law and growth.  We accept that clear property 
rights and rule of law reduce transactional friction, and facilitate economic activity.  
Insofar as they effectively enforce property rights and contracts, law courts serve as an 
institutional intermediary between commercial interests and the leadership of autocrat 
democratic regimes alike.     
 On the surface, promoting a safe investment environment may appear to foreign 
investors and policy advocates as a progressive liberal improvement.  The liberalisation 
of foreign investment, however, may be linked to strategies of coalition building that 
increase economic inequality and limit access to the political process.   The links between 
economic and political liberalisation are more difficult to establish than is generally 
understood in the literature on modernisation.  
Business surveys based on investor perceptions typically correlate judicial reforms 
as a positive step towards advancing political stability and political opening.  But 
perceptions can overstate the synchronicity of institutional reforms to outcomes.  They 
disregard the prospect that judicial reforms may constitute a parallel system of regime 
legitimacy that rarely serves as an ultimate check on the power of the executive.  
Although an obvious advantage exists for investors to seek and support the building of 
effective systems of commercial law around the world, an institutional design that may 
seem to be conducive for capital to potential investors, may have originated for entirely 
different political reasons and may buffet authoritarian regimes by enhancing the tools 
available to the incumbent to buy loyalty.   
A tension exists between the financial incentive of the ruler to attract foreign 
investment and the autocrat’s political incentive to use property rights selectively.  
Growth is only indirectly linked to the ruler’s revenue stream. From the autocrat’s 
perspective, property rights are another tool to facilitate political and economic 
enrichment of regime followers in which loyalty, not consumer surpluses, are being 
optimised.  Foreign investors may have valuable links to members of the winning 
coalition, or they may have resources that help leaders circumvent rivals.  The ruler has 
an incentive to maintain a stable policy for enforcing property rights for financial elites 
because avoiding a financial crisis is essential to ensuring regime survival. But the 
autocrat may be less gracious with political opponents, and may direct the courts to 
practice selective enforcement.  Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew is alleged to have used the 
courts to bankrupt political opponents [Mauzy and Milne (2002), pp. 132-136]. The 
courts in Singapore were effective in processing commercial litigation and could identify 
the asset flows and resources of opponents, and then prosecute them with targeted tax 
enforcement.  Coupled with effective administrative follow-up, the efficiency of the court 
system made threats to opponents more credible.  The institutions that give Singapore a 
reputation for clean business practices also enables its leaders to intimidate political 
opponents. 
In Indonesia when export and import markets were freed from controls, the best 
contracts often depend on partnerships with politically connected figures.  Fisman (2001) 
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has quantified this dynamic in Indonesia after liberalisation and found that the value of 
political connections actually increased with liberalisation.  The distinction between 
broad growth and targeted economic interventions that reward political allies with 
investment opportunities is difficult to observe in data, where increased activity may be 
revealed in growth statistics that do not show the market distortions resulting, for 
example, from the reward of monopolies to political supporters, and other forms of 
political rents collected in exchange for economic privileges.  With their control over 
natural resources Indonesia’s leadership can establish narrow coalitional foundations by 
selectively distributing market access as private benefits to regime supporters.  Resources 
relieve it of the need to develop a clean business environment to attract adequate capital 
to sustain a broad-based governing coalition.  Narrowing the winning coalition allows top 
leaders to keep the maximum returns for their own consumption and to ward off 
rebellion.  
 
DILEMMA 2:  Financial Credibility and Debt Repayment  
Institutions that promote rules over discretion provide political leaders with access 
to private capital at lower cost than would otherwise be the case.  This insight is derived 
from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), who focused on the advantage of rules 
over discretion in monetary policy and the related role of central banks.  In one extension 
of their model Root (1989) explores how the state can enjoy better credit terms, that is a 
lower interest rate, when able to borrow from intermediaries that are subjected to 
independent courts for enforcement of non-payment of financial arrears.  Such 
institutions reduce the costs of credit to the state by enabling leaders to draw upon the 
credibility of intermediary bodies that are themselves subject to a rule of law, whereas the 
head of state may not be.  Constraining sovereign discretion with regard to financial 
activity actually strengthens the ability of leaders to raise funds from private sources at 
more attractive rates than those available if the leader attempted to borrow directly from 
capital markets. Surprisingly, modern day regimes with access to sources of external 
finance have weaker incentive to develop effective commercial courts, than the kings of 
early modern European states.  
 The necessity to secure funds for war drove much of the institutional innovation 
that occurred in feudal France and England.  In both cases, when the monarchs were 
above the law, they could not be compelled to repay their debts, and so had more 
difficulty finding sources of credit.  As a result of royal discretion, monarchs enjoyed  
credit that was weaker than that of many of their subjects.  The kings’ onerous cost of 
capital could be mitigated by new institutional arrangements that benefited financiers and 
investors while ensuring a steady supply of government financing.   Kings could not 
borrow against discretion, so they were compelled to create a legal regime that remained 
after the personality of the king.   
 In England, the crown needed the revenues of elites and designed a court system 
that gave rise to a constitutional monarchy with strong protection of the property rights of 
the landholders and bondholders.  North and Weingast (1989) have pointed out that the 
English kings benefited from the rise of Parliament, by allowing it to raise taxes to fund 
the kings’ debts.  The British parliament was worried and wanted to prevent the king 
from getting money through sources other than the parliament itself.  The Glorious 
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Revolution placed limits on the Crown’s ability to unilaterally change the terms of its 
financial agreements, which enhanced its credibility. In exchange for purse strings, the 
king gained a source of revenue at lower cost than was available to any other government 
in Europe, which allowed England to become the master of the oceans and eventually of 
international commerce.  Strong domestic commercial law was necessary to generate the 
funds from which parliament could tax.  Ironically, when international donors provide 
bilateral or multilateral funds to present day autocrats, they reduce incentives for the 
government to provide strong domestic protection for commercial transactions.   
 In France, the intermediary was not a legislative body, but rather a private body 
chartered by the King with the privilege of collecting royal taxes.  The collectors often 
advanced their own funds to the Crown knowing they could access the king’s courts and 
army to draw upon the collective resources of the village communities, the guilds, and the 
provincial estates. The corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and 
could therefore offer credible financial commitments.  In return for official recognition 
and privileges, these corporate groups acted as bankers for the King, providing funds at 
lower rates than the king could find on his own.    
 Taxing peasants also required that their collective village property be protected, 
which had corollary political benefits.  By granting peasants access to the courts to 
protect the tax base, the king used the courts to build up constituent support from groups 
that might otherwise be marginal.  His direct political objective was to supplant peasant 
allegiance from local seigneurs to the agents of the king.  Indirectly the subordination of 
seigniorial authority to royal supervision may have had unintended revolutionary 
implications, creating a process that would lead towards the revolutionary events of 1789. 
The law of the king’s courts became a venue in which a contest between peasant villages 
and their traditional seigniorial masters could be waged.  The courts fanned the animosity 
towards seigniorial dues by hearing the grievances of peasant communities against their 
lords.  The contests became more adversarial by virtue of the fact that the seigneurs 
enjoyed tax exempt status, dating from the days they provided military service to the 
king.  But by the eighteenth century, it was the taxes on the peasantry that financed the 
king’s wars.  In Great Britain, by contrast, the lords shouldered the burden of paying local 
taxes, and their authority grew in proportion to the burdens of national security that they 
bore for the entire community.  Hence, there was more justification of the English lord’s 
economic status and their enterprises gained protection in national law.  
Today the heads of government rarely enjoy incentives similar to the monarchs of 
eighteenth century Europe to protect the enterprises of productive sectors of the 
population because they can substitute international loans for capital drawn from sources 
of domestic taxation.  This is true for both developed and developing countries.  For 
developing countries, international financing often means an absence of a commitment to 
protecting the property rights of majorities, in favour of selectively distributed economic 
privileges that provide a loyalty premium to the head of state.  If she is lucky, natural 
resources such as oil or diamonds may be enough to finance the regime, and the messy 
business of negotiating tax revenue can be avoided.  International financing from the 
multilateral development banks and donors is another attractive source of funding, 
allowing the ruler autonomy from society.  If the regime does require tax revenue to 
survive, a unique set of incentives arises that can lay the groundwork for democratic 
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transitions.  This transformation can be seen in the practice of effective government by 
China’s KMT after it lost the mainland.   
While the change process occurred at different rates, both France and England’s 
innovations in the institutions of participatory governance were driven by the fiscal 
necessity of the state. With the advent of the international financial institutions, domestic 
taxation is not the only option for securing government resources.  Foreign debt has 
caused further rifts between rulers and citizens, as foreign policy concessions made by 
dictators are often granted by developing countries to donors in exchange for extended 
credit. 
 
DILEMMA 3: Secrecy, Central Authority, and Administrative Discipline 
The secrecy inherent in the extremely hierarchical nature of autocratic regimes 
generates internal contradictions regarding the use and abuse of information by 
administrators at lower levels of the regime.  Effective authoritarian governance requires 
that information be passed up and down the ladder of authority; however, there tends to 
be an overload of information at the top that creates opportunities to hoard information at 
the lower level, progressively diminishing the authority of the ruler.  Low level 
administrators can strip regime assets to create personal fiefdoms obscured from the 
purview of central government actors.    
 Layers of authority exist between the head of state and local administrators, 
creating ample opportunity for orders to be confused or mishandled.  Judicial decisions 
and censures from senior officials are further confused by protests, excuses and appeals 
pitched to central authorities.  Administrative complexity overlapping responsibilities 
slows communication and results in the loss of timely information, facilitating the 
stripping of state assets for private gain.  
 Many autocrats depend on local notables whose resources constitute an 
independent power base.  They must be co-opted into supporting the regime, but their 
loyalty can never be counted upon.  Imbued with local biases they seek to guard local or 
regional privileges; their scope for hiding information and action is considerable. The 
policy decisions that are directed towards them are often construed in ways that fit their 
own needs.  There is no easy way to solve this problem of local non-conformity; creating 
administrative law and using central courts to watch over local communities risks 
confrontation.  Military force is always an option but it complicates the prospects of 
future local cooperation. Inevitably when local big men are well entrenched money spent 
locally will further perpetuate their control over local patronage networks.  The leader 
can demarcate areas of local jurisdiction that fall under central control and slowly erode 
localised power, but the risks of hidden action and information will persist.   
 Kenneth Arrow’s insights concerning “hidden information” and “hidden action” 
in corporate structures [Arrow (1979)] offer useful parallels to the information 
asymmetries in authoritarian governments.  As the agent of the stockholders, corporate 
management may pursue a project it knows to be unprofitable if it produces perks or 
salary benefits that management can enjoy.  Likewise, an agent of the government may 
distort information (hidden information) about the performance of government policies 
and avoid passing along information about local economic conditions or the potential for 
governmental revenue generation.  Agents can trade on information about planned 
Root and May 
 
1308
government policies or projects (hidden action), striking black market side deals with 
other administrators or with private parties.  Local officials become adept at stripping the 
value of the government assets at their disposal to earn private profits.  
 The autocrat may create or reinvent the courts to address this principal-agent 
problem to prevent the erosion of power and impose supervision on agents, in order to 
constrain their ability to conceal information for their private benefit.   The administrative 
discipline administered by the courts helps to build legitimacy for the regime because the 
visible effects of re-centralising authority are perceived as reducing corruption to the 
benefit of society, recovering lost economic surpluses, and removing secondary officials 
who have distorted rule enforcement by distributing opportunities to their own local 
networks. 
 A significant literature has emerged that attributes the fall of the Soviet Union to 
the loss of hierarchical discipline at lower levels [Frye and Shleifer (1996)].23 The 
corruption that was unleashed after the end of the Cold War was just the extension of a 
process that had already been underway.  Local officials had been hiding information 
about the efficacy of policies from the central government and taking hidden actions that 
enabled them to gain control over government assets.  Only the local officials knew about 
side-deals amongst each other.  Today, one of the most trenchant criticisms levelled at 
Communist Party officials in China is that lower-ranking representatives are using their 
authority to collect rents such as fees for services at the local level, and then not 
transferring that revenue upward.  Resources are being diverted away from the centre 
making it difficult for Beijing to provide government services demanded by local 
populations. 
 While information asymmetries and corruption have been acknowledged in the 
literature as a problem for central governments, monitoring is the only recommended 
solution.  While monitoring is a traditional function of court systems, monitoring alone 
does not contribute to the liberalisation of the regime. Typically, monitoring is a way to 
exert central authority over the periphery.  A side effect may be new avenues of 
contestation, but that is not the goal of such reforms. An incentive structure based on 
bureaucratic competition may offer the best hope for a sustainable path to transparency 
and administrative unity.   
 Alternatively, the autocrat’s utility may not require that administrative discipline 
be enforced.   A weak court system and lack of transparency allow rulers more options 
for amassing private wealth.  Although the surplus or productivity of the economy is 
compromised, the distributional impact may still be favourable to regime longevity.  As 
mentioned earlier with the Indonesian example, autocrats may overlook opacity and 
corruption in order to guarantee that the state intervenes on behalf of investors, thus 
ensuring central economic control.  If the autocrat does not need the courts to secure 
income or reward the winning coalition, resources will be diverted away from the courts 
and they will suffer from under-funding.  When courts are appended to stand-alone legal 
ministries, they rarely have funding to undertake their core responsibilities and are often 
prone to bribe-taking, ultimately undermining their legitimacy.  
 
2Frye and Shleifer found in a survey of Moscow shop owners that only 50 percent of respondents felt 
that the courts would “defend their rights if the government grossly violated their property rights” [Frye and 
Shleifer (1996:5)]. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS TOWARDS ORDERED LIBERTY: LINKAGES   
BETWEEN POLTICAL DISCIPLINE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
What is the incentive of an autocracy to adequately finance the courts? In some 
authoritarian regimes such as South Korea during the 1960s and 70s, the courts were 
under direct supervision and control of security forces, and in fact became an arm of the 
state security apparatus. Paradoxically leaders that create judicial institutions that 
improve internal security for defense against enemies of the state can use these same 
institutions to establish effective courts that enjoy the respect of the population. In weak 
states legal institutions are viewed as protecting the private interests of the wealthy.  
Attaching the court system to the security function has a strong effect on the ability of the 
courts to function effectively.  The security apparatus of the state is the most important 
disciplinary agent of an authoritarian regime. Ironically, a connection with the regime’s 
security function may be the source of funding that allows the courts to do disregard the 
power of external influence over contract enforcement, and to establish a reputation for 
professionalism. This relationship explains in large part the reputation for 
professionalism enjoyed by the judges of South Korea during the martial law period.  The 
courts of Nazi Germany enjoyed the same high status. Court systems that are effective at 
disciplining political opponents are likely to be well-resourced and efficient at enforcing 
property rights and commercial legislation.  Judges that are directly responsible for the 
survival of the regime are likely to enjoy greater esteem than judges who are members of 
stand alone judicial ministries that tend to be under-funded and prone to corruption.  If 
judicial personnel are well-paid, they have little incentive to hoard information and 
collect rents that divert economic activity. 
 The security connection also comes into play after court decisions are made, 
when enforcement is required to render court decisions credible.  Enforcement is easily 
provided if the courts are attached to the security apparatus, but when courts are stand-
alone institutions, their authority can be circumvented because of inadequate policing and 
funding. 
The courts can rarely question if the basis for the regime is legitimate because 
doing so may lead to questions of the legitimacy of the court itself. Judges are aware that 
it is best to let others decide politically dangerous cases because in authoritarian systems 
the courts will generally be the losers in contests with the head of state. Judicial 
leadership of challenges to the regime can be ended by retiring judicial leaders.  
Moreover, potential judicial leaders would generally lack authority over subordinate 
court staff.  
Most non-Western legal systems do not base their authority upon universal 
principles.  Without universal principles, the courts are rarely if ever in a position to 
challenge the final authority of the regime, in spite of judicial independence in other 
spheres of civil or contract law. For example, when Thaksin was elected prime minister 
of Thailand, the opposition questioned his eligibility to rule based on accusations of tax 
evasion.  The Constitutional Court ruled in Thaksin’s favour, arguing that the electorate 
already knew of these charges and elected him anyway, and it was not the mandate of the 
court to contradict the electoral mandate of the population.  In the Philippines, Marcos 
declared martial law, which the courts accepted on the grounds that he had been a 
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democratically elected president. This initial rubber stamp became a turning point in the 
loss of independence for the courts, which had previously been perceived as meritocratic 
and professional.  Jensen (1997: 82) explains: 
As he expanded the role of the military, Marcos limited the power of the judiciary.  
To ensure that his policies were implemented as he saw necessary, Marcos needed to 
curb the independence and review powers of the Supreme Court.  Directly or indirectly, 
Marcos exerted pressure on the Supreme Court to give him a free rein; in turn, the court 
exercised a great deal of self-regulation to avoid confrontation with Marcos. 
Frequently, a dual reality develops in authoritarian regimes in which a separation 
occurs between the regime’s questionable  moral legitimacy and its effective performance 
of routine daily civic functions, further reducing the court’s capacity to effectively 
challenge the moral legitimacy of the regime.  But the existence of judicial review may 
create a space in which the forces for contesting the regime will gather and in which they 
will learn how to coordinate using tools provided by the regime itself to later challenge 
the status quo.   
     
THE LAW AND REGIME CHANGE 
This section explores how court systems can play the dual role of protecting 
property rights, ensuring smooth civic processes such as marriage and divorce, as well as 
sustaining the legitimacy of autocratic rule. When considering how the courts can 
contribute to political liberalisation, it is not just the institutional framework that matters, 
but rather that legal reform is part of a broader context of social reform.  The courts 
mirror that larger process, whether they enhance or retard it.  The courts can have a  dual 
nature, providing legalistic justification for regime legitimacy and the ruler’s arbitrary 
discipline of political opponents, while remaining more independent when dealing with 
contract or family law.   
 The courts can play a stabilising role by providing access to administrative law 
processes that can release tensions and instabilities before they erupt. The evolution of 
institutions does not always optimise broad social welfare. Political and economic 
evolution is a process of adaptation and survival in the face of external pressure and 
competition, and the result is often policy volatility.  In newly emerging states, 
particularly, weak institutions can cost elites the opportunity to reap the rewards of 
power.  Judicial institutions adjust to an equilibrium strategy, facilitating enough 
economic activity to optimise resources for the winning coalition, while serving the 
ruler’s political security.  
By providing a mechanism for resolving administrative disputes, judicial venues to 
resolve grievances can release volatility in the system.  If the courts support the denial of 
citizens’ right to assemble, mobilise, and organise for political purposes, open and inclusive 
administrative processes are unlikely to stimulate long term political reform.  Alternatively, in 
the courts’ role of reinforcing central authority, the courts may provide a venue to expose 
contradictions that can lead to disintegration of the regime.  In this case the courts rarely 
initiate change, but rather provide a forum to voice changes already underway.   
Political discourse may or may not evolve in an administrative court system that is 
primarily used to impose supervision on local leaders, as in China.  At the base, citizens 
may perceive a dual court system as one in which grievances can be legitimately aired 
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and potentially resolved, giving the appearance of inclusivity and effectiveness, which 
contributes to regime legitimacy.34 Autocrats that rule inclusively with a combination of 
strong political security and some access to arbitration to resolve local disputes may be 
able to cushion their rule from shocks in the economy or external environment. 
 
Dualism and Inclusivity as Steady-state Equilibrium 
As noted earlier, today’s autocrats have several channels to circumvent reliance on 
domestic taxation to secure revenues for the regime.  By far the most efficient is the 
possession of resources demanded by world markets that can be controlled by regime 
leaders, such as oil or diamonds.    Without the fiscal incentive to protect taxable assets of 
regime citizens, the process of political liberalisation will stall.  A second opportunity to 
rule without domestic accountability is made available through bilateral or multilateral 
bank lending to the sovereign.  The loans most frequently benefit the incumbent 
leadership and the interests they represent, despite lending guidelines established by 
international law.  The possession of revenues that come from sources that enhance an 
autocrat’s independence from accountability to societal groups allows the leadership to 
shape those groups according to its own interests.  The resource curse,45 like the foreign 
aid curse, gives rise to large selectorate-small winning coalition systems in which 
political competition is stifled and some measure of judicial independence is lost.   
   Regimes that rely on peasants or other marginal groups for legitimacy do have 
an incentive to provide access to the legal system.  The opportunity for poor farmers to 
appeal to the courts, however, does not imply that the autocracy will disintegrate; in fact 
it is more likely to contribute to stability by giving rulers ways to supplant the traditional 
powers of local elites.  Thaksin in Thailand became well-known for programmes that 
benefited the poor. He did this expressly to circumvent local patronage networks that 
empowered local leaders.  Thaksin had centralised political funding, letting big money 
politics overcome local political influence; once their power base was attenuated local 
leaders had to support Thaksin or risk losing elections.   
 In China, the Communist Party has been strengthened by increased growth, but 
as a result of dynamic economic activity, the coalitional structure shifted toward a new 
class of financial elites, forcing a formal change in the Party Constitution.  China scholar 
Hongying Wang discussed the CCP’s adaptation strategy in a recent interview with 
Fareed Zakaria  [Wang (2006)]: 
…the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party has reinvented itself. That’s the key; 
they’re…not the Communist Party that you know about or people idealise about. 
There’s nothing communist about it except that it is a one-party system and it is 
determined to do everything, including changing its own nature to stay in power. The 
new principle as it is written in the Party Constitution now—the Party represents the 
most advanced production force, which means the capitalists or the capital owners; it 
represents the most advanced culture, which means professionals, intellectuals, and 
advanced “everybody’s interests,” which is just … covering every aspect. 
 
3Jeane Kirkpatrick subscribed to the notion that the most resilient autocratic regimes are the most 
totalitarian.  This doctrine was clearly discredited after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
4See Michael Ross’s 1999 article “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse” for a review of the 
inverse relationship between natural resource endowments and growth. 
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The adaptation of judicial independence within a limited sphere of activity does 
not imply that political liberalisation will ultimately result.  Local dispute resolution may 
contribute to growth as a strategy to ensure continued centralised authority, but growth 
may also increase inequality, which works to the advantage of the ruler.  Inequality can 
be exploited by the autocrat to further cement control by increasing the loyalty premium, 
the ruler can extract from the winning coalition. When being cut off from the winning 
coalition means mediocre access to resources, the cost of gaining loyalty is reduced.  
Thus, members of the winning coalition have more to lose when the society is more 
unequal – loyalty can thus be purchased more inexpensively.    
The courts can become effective as vehicles for the activism of opposition only 
once the regime has already started to weaken.  Hongying Wang continues: 
…people [are] looking at their neighbours, their urban cousins getting rich…Some 
of these protests are about local environment issues, …unemployment…about half 
of [college students] them end up graduating not immediately finding jobs. … I 
think on the one hand it does represent a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the 
government; on the other hand I do not think in the near future it is going to 
generate the kind of collapse that people are sometimes talking about, because the 
Chinese Communist Party has been very smart from its own point of view in that 
you can protest as long as you guys do not get organised. You can talk all you 
want, so there is much more freedom now in China in terms of people’s ability to 
express their discontent—just do not get organised. And the problem is if you are 
thinking of a revolution or any kind of meaningful upheaval without organisation 
these protests are not going to cause any major change. 
The Chinese example demonstrates that the granting of limited freedoms can be a 
strategy for legitimising the regime without sacrificing central authority.  As an instrument of 
that authority, the courts can still rule in favour of local plaintiffs in cases of low-level 
corruption without jeopardising political security of central leadership.  Judgments that favour 
selectorate members reduce the threat of potential challengers from within to the winning 
coalition.  In China, for example, Jiang Zemin rarely challenged the Shanghai Gang and his 
allies among the princelings, the children of revolutionary leaders, leaving behind a legacy of 
high level corruption that his successor Hu Jintao is trying to erase.   In effect, by becoming 
the party of the haves, the capitalists and the bourgeoisie, the Communist party has eliminated 
any meaningful and serious threats to the Party.  
 
Revolution or Evolution  
Further research on the nature of court cases in China is needed to determine the extent 
to which access to administrative courts is giving a voice to a new set of democratic 
challenges to the legitimacy of the CCP. Even if it is, this discourse is not initially dangerous 
until the regime starts to weaken due to other inherent contradictions or pressures.  It is 
possible that the growing inequality in China constitutes such a contradiction.  The courts 
could potentially be used to expose underlying instability in the coalitional structure that could 
lead to dramatic political change.  Dualism may serve as an adaptation that provides regime 
stability, but because the incentives of autocratic rulers may diverge dramatically from the 
interests of society, courts that were originally designed to facilitate and lengthen authoritarian 
rule may actually become weapons against the regime [Moustafa (2006)]. 
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This occurred in Old Regime France, as de Toqueville argued.  By supplanting 
the reciprocal bonds between lord and peasants with central bureaucratic codes, the 
monarchy initiated a revolutionary process that ultimately led to the regime’s demise.  
In The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) de Tocqueville contends that it was the 
Crown’s attempts at reform which “roused the people by trying to offer them relief.”  
The shift to a rule-based system of centralised authority that weakened the Seigneurie 
created political space in which reforms became “practices thanks to which the 
government completed the people’s revolutionary education”.  Inequality of status, 
symbolised by residual feudal dues owed to local seigneurs, became suspect. 
Seigneurial roles for the local community had become tenuous, and their tax-exempt 
status became more odious as their authority became more residual.  The courts 
provided a venue to air long-standing grievances against seigneurial exactions and 
domination [Root (1985)]. 
The White Revolution initiated by the Shah of Iran in 1963 provides a more 
contemporary example of reforms that highlighted deep-seated inequalities to initiate a 
revolutionary process.  The Shah hoped that economic growth would provide a substitute 
and ultimately a source of social coherence, but growth created conflict instead [Root 
(2006)].  Opportunities for capital accumulation were linked to a system of social 
exclusion.  Meaningful policy participation was barred; democratic and meritocratic 
channels of access within the state were not built.  In contrast to the anti-religious 
sentiment of the Enlightenment in the French Revolution, Khomeini’s Iranian revolution 
in response to the Shah used the banner of organised Islam to provide a framework for 
the democratic political challenge.  While the regime enjoyed early popular support and 
made social gains in terms of political participation, rules and regulations promoting 
access to capital for new enterprises not controlled by the government are stiffly opposed 
by the incumbent leadership. The Revolution’s agenda did not emphasise eliminating 
corruption, or establishing an institutional and legal capacity necessary for a market 
economy. As a result, Iran’s productivity declined after religious rule was established and 
has stagnated ever since.   
 Instead of economic conflicts, the courts in the Soviet Union exposed a different 
set of contradictions after the Communist leadership signed the Helsinki Accords.  The 
Russians were subjected to human rights criteria that undermined the legitimacy of the 
regime and gave the U.S. a wedge to impose constraints.  One unintended consequence 
benefited Russian Jews by allowing them to migrate to Israel, but the favouritism they 
enjoyed led other Russians to ask why they too did not enjoy similar rights; the Accords 
had an unintended subversive effect that set the stage for Soviet decline as domestic 
discontent was empowered with a universal criteria with which to measure their own 
leaders.   
 The Iranian and Russian examples provide evidence to support the notion that a 
connection exists between the role of the courts and regime disintegration, but not that 
growth or democracy will necessarily result, or that a formalised democratic constitution 
will necessarily increase the welfare of society.   For two centuries the revolutionary goal 
of responsibility and equal burden sharing had not been met in France. Informal norms 
continued to reinforce structures of elite domination including domination over entire 
sectors of the modern economy.  
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The celebrated case of England’s transition to democracy, led by the rise of 
Parliament, could be described as more of an evolutionary process than a revolutionary 
one.  An often overlooked aspect of this evolution is that for the Parliament to be 
effective it depended on the ability of the head of state to assert sovereignty over the 
entire kingdom.  In England it was often said that the King was strongest in Parliament 
because it simplified getting the assent of the entire nation.  The French king’s rule over a 
mosaic nation had to employ much more cumbersome procedures to gain cooperation 
from his subjects.  A considerable waste of resources resulted. 
 In systems with diminished winning coalitions and poor institutional 
infrastructure, resistance to reform of legal institutions is well focused and easy to 
organise.  That opposition can come from entrenched social groups whose interests are 
threatened by judicial independence. Opposition can also come from within the 
bureaucracy.  Legal ministries might resist the formalisation of commercial law, as a 
rules-over-discretion approach would directly challenge the legitimacy of the regime.  
Finance ministries may be allied with reform, but they have no jurisdiction to promote it.  
In such cases, a Common Law approach may be much more effective at instilling viable 
procedures for enforcing contracts and mediating civil and commercial disputes.  As 
individual cases are arbitrated, precedents are set and legal efficiency can slowly evolve.  
This reform strategy has been proposed as a possible mechanism to build up legal 
capacity in Africa, where legal ministries resist reform efforts because it would constitute 
a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the autocrat’s rule. The French kings of the twelfth 
century astutely managed the diversity of regional legal institutions not by abruptly 
abolishing them, but by appointing a royal representative as local supervisor, facilitating 
a slower transition to a uniform legal code, less threatening to local interests.  The danger 
with moving reforms too fast is that the contradictions inherent in the regime and the 
incompatibility between formal and informal institutions can create a backlash situation 
in which resistance to reform increases, further entrenching authoritarian rule.   
 
The Law and Emerging Loyalty to the State 
The institutionalist argument for legal reform that seeks to replicate formal 
structures with effective enforcement of commercial law must be combined with the 
political argument that takes the ruler’s strategy for political survival into account.  
Building a rule of law is part of the political process in which the state acquires its 
legitimacy as upholder of the law, and in which the organs of state power are viewed as 
existing to enforce the law.  The first national institutions were identified with the 
monarch who embodied the nation morally and politically.  The duty of the king to 
uphold the law became the moral justification for political leadership.  Eventually the 
monarchs of Europe accepted that political power must be defined by law, so that by the 
eighteenth century, most administrative and legal matters were handled by professional 
administrators who acted independently of royal prerogative.  Paradoxically, it was the 
strong political identification with the monarch that enabled the growing independence of 
government administration.   
Qualitative studies of the origin of the rule of law in Western Europe have shown 
that the existence of courts does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the supremacy 
of law, nor to the emergence of an authority which will enforce the law [Strayer (1970), 
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p. 7]. Rather change in judicial systems, as an adaptive process like evolution, does not 
produce an optimal and consistent outcome such as a recognisable liberal regime. The 
legitimacy of leadership must first be established before the courts will be viewed as 
upholders of a society based on law.  In Western Europe the development of a society of 
law was an integral part of the political process of state building. The courts emerged as 
institutions of law that strengthened the political identity of the group; local identity fused 
with loyalty to the state and ultimately with nationalism. This fundamental aspect of the 
European tradition—the emphasis on national cohesion embodied by a unifying national 
symbol—has been surprisingly embraced by the Chinese.  In this case, the Communist 
Party functions as that symbol rather than the monarchy.  The Chinese are only now just 
beginning to create law schools and to train judges, fifty years after the process of 
building a modern state began, and three decades after pro-market reforms were initiated.   
For the courts to function in any society there must be an ability to distinguish 
between public and private—a distinction that is only beginning to take root in the habits 
and beliefs of the population in many emerging nations.   In many developing countries 
basic security comes from pre-state organisations—family, neighbours and the local 
strongman—not from the state.  In many patrimonial African regimes that emerged after 
the Colonialists departed, the strongest loyalties were to family and persons rather than to 
abstractions such as the national state. Instead of providing enduring institutions to 
deliver efficient administration, the strategy of political leaders was to gain control over 
existing governments or over residual colonial institutions for purposes of personal 
aggrandizement, and they accordingly used the courts to protect the income and 
prerogatives of the leadership.  Latin America’s courts functioned primarily to protect the 
private interests of the wealthy.  In both examples the existence of courts does not lead to 
the acceptance of the supremacy of law.   
Communist regimes, by comparison with African and Latin American legal 
systems, more effectively laid a foundation for broad public acceptance of the institutions 
of government.  Communist societies deliberately avoided distinguishing between the 
private interests of citizens and the public concerns of the state. They elevated the 
interests of the state above all else and so dissolved primordial loyalties and networks of 
clientage and dependency that still exist in many former-colonial regimes.   
 The desire of the poorer classes for security and good government in 
authoritarian countries has been constantly frustrated by the fact that leaders sought 
stability and longevity by appealing to the propertied classes.  This process of mass 
identification with the symbols of state power has often failed to occur in many 
authoritarian regimes for both external and internal reasons. Many leaders during the 
Cold War cooperated with the geopolitical strategies of the major industrial powers in 
exchange for the resources needed to gain the approval of the privileged minorities.  
Governments could secure power without providing public services such as broadly 
available law, security, health and sanitation that citizens demand in exchange for loyalty 
and resources. Necessary improvements in legal processes could be postponed. As a 
result loyalty to the state must vie with other loyalties. The state, without real impact on 
the quality of people’s lives, enjoys only limited respect.   
 The national leaders of many third world nations have little in common with the 
citizenry. Local leaders, sometimes members of politically suspect groups who are 
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involved with day to day security, are not recognised by government to create judicial 
institutions. Examples such as Hezbollah or the war lords of Afghanistan come to mind. 
During European development the more competent local leaders were the first to 
establish courts and other instruments of state power.  But many leaders today derive 
their fiscal capacity to rule from resources that are independent of the people who are 
being governed.  Autocrats often survive because they have access to external resources 
and as noted base the stability of their regime on the support of the propertied and 
politically privileged groups; their political survival strategies differ fundamentally from 
democratically elected leaders.  External processes triggered by the Cold War which 
provided external funding for compliant dictators, and the resource curse which put 
resources into the hands of government elites, all interfered with the emergence of strong 
and accountable national states.  External resources, generally available only to the 
incumbent leadership, lessen the efficacy of domestic political challengers, reducing the 
incentives for incumbents to be concerned with structural reforms and institution 
building.     
The larger process of building political legitimacy for the instruments of state 
power will ultimately determine if the courts emerge as upholders of the supremacy of 
law.  The legitimacy of the state determines the legitimacy of its institutions, such as the 
courts.  As part of the basis for state building, the judicial system will not be truly 
effective until the other basic institutional components—both formal and informal—are 
already in place.  The integrity of the courts and of the laws they uphold will flourish 
only once loyalty to the state becomes an item of faith for large majorities as opposed to 
small winning coalitions. To sustain such faith, legal reforms must be incentive 
compatible across many dimensions—financing, credibility, security, and general 
welfare—with the ruler’s strategy for survival and the interests of population at large. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR LINKING LEGAL REFORM     
WITH POLITICAL LIBERALISATION 
Many of today’s autocracies have court systems that are better organised than in 
the past.  It remains an open question whether more effective courts will produce greater 
loyalty to the ruler and to the state or whether they will be a forum for opposition and for 
the replacement of the existing regime.  
To assist policymakers scholars must work toward mapping the characteristics of 
courts in regimes that have effectively implemented growth-enhancing institutions, those 
that have working democracies and the rare cases in which legal and institutional reforms 
do in fact lead to growth and democracy.  We must ask when these are two separate 
issues and when they converge.   
For the courts to facilitate social change they must be venues that encourage 
innovation and competition.  The courts are rarely created for this purpose and only serve 
this purpose indirectly.  Courts must actively protect innovators instead of punishing 
them.  This must be distinguished from the simple protection of property rights, which 
will inevitably focus on protecting elites to the exclusion of more marginal 
constituencies.  The Coase Theorem that stresses reduction of transaction costs is not 
very helpful in the context of developing economies since the poor lack the resources to 
defend their property rights.   
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Cultural Considerations 
Imposing formal institutional structures on a society with incompatible traditions 
is unlikely to succeed in bringing about lasting reform.  Courts in the U.S. derive their 
authority from a constitutional mandate to interpret legislation.  In most other societies 
the courts are an extension of the executive function.  Without the balancing effect of the 
other branches, the scope for reform via the courts is limited. We tend to assume that 
court and legal reform along these lines is a healthy, inevitable pattern of evolution that 
contributes to human betterment—others see reform as a means to an end, an end for 
which there may be better means to attain those goals.   
 Western legal systems are distinguished by a very sharp distinction between 
private and public law.  The expectation of citizens from Western legal traditions is that a 
neutral framework in which both systems (private and public) of the law can coexist.  
China and other communist countries may be very rule bound with strong public and 
civic law.  Apparently there was more “civil law” in China than the first generation of 
Western scholars identified because they assumed that civic law implies a separation 
from public law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The links between the judicial institutions and liberalisation is ambiguous at best.  
Even when the courts enforce property rights, contract and family law, judicial power 
may block innovation and competition by selectively promoting rights of established 
firms and technologies they control.  Underneath the rules and procedures of formal 
constitutions and codes of conduct, the courts can be used to protect incumbent wealth.  
Governments may employ courts to improve contract enforcement, loan repayment and 
bureaucratic discipline and still not allow citizens the right to assemble, mobilise and 
organise for political purposes. As already noted, in autocracy the inclusiveness of legal 
rights and protection does not need to be any larger than the coalition that the leader 
cultivates to elevate her political power.  Leaders who do not depend on broad coalitions 
have numerous ways to extend their tenure in office by manipulating judicial institutions.  
For this reason it is necessary for future analysis to distinguish between those functions of 
the court that advance or retard democratic change. It is not just the institutional 
framework that matters, but rather that legal reform is part of a broader context of social 
reform.  The judicial system will lack legitimacy until the other instruments of national 
sovereignty win citizen acceptance. 
Modern autocrats in contemporary Russia and Kazakhstan have learned how to 
prevent people from coordinating political activism or dissent while at the same time 
encouraging foreign investment.  The key point for the literature to absorb is that the 
interests of leaders can be divorced from the national interests of the populations they 
lead.  Modern autocrats can actually decrease the probability of revolt by being 
successful economically, so we must learn to distinguish between those that come to 
power in existing arrangements and those leaders who pose a revolutionary challenge that 
will alter the regime’s coalitional foundations and expand the winning coalition by 
increasing the provision of public goods.  Such leaders will inevitably undertake 
revolutionary transformations of the legal system.  But so far we have not found any 
reason to believe that judicial institutionalisatio
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Turkey provides an example of the judiciary working closely with the military to 
modernised the country, and the implication is clearly that judicial power conflicts 
directly with the emergence of democratic forces which contain strong anti-modern 
elements.  In Pakistan and Israel, migrants displaced indigenous populations and 
introduced national judicial systems where none had previously existed.  In both of these 
cases, the national judicial system was used to undermine the democratic will of the 
indigenous population.   
There may be particular institutional innovations that contribute to democratic reform, 
and we need to identify those and distinguish them from the general process of legal reform.  
It may be possible that leaders can reduce the likelihood of democratic revolt by providing 
courts that offer citizens redress to the performance of the administrative functions of 
government.  We have also discussed in this paper that corruption in the courts can increase 
when the judicial system is under-funded so that even if the judges have lifetime tenure, their 
credibility can be undermined simply by underpaying them.  A weak financial base can make 
it possible for the courts to be intimidated by non-state actors.   
Our analysis indicates that the courts are part of the fabric of broader societal 
change but can under restricted conditions precipitate change.  Further research on what 
these conditions are will help define how reform of the courts is interwoven with larger 
social movements, and whether we can consider legal reform as a driving force, or an 
important incidental.   
 
APPENDIX I 
The Centre for Public Integrity, Global Integrity Project 
Future research is needed to judicial institutionalisation with political outcomes 
such as democracy.  Some measures can be found in Freedom House or Polity IV, which 
distinguishes democracies from authoritarian regimes.  The relationships between these 
outcomes can be tested against institutional variables that are quantifiable, such as 
whether judges have lifetime tenure, how they are selected, what legal systems they 
employ, and how long cases remain in the dockets before being resolved. What are the 
mechanisms available to the head of state to circumvent the courts and reserve rights in 
the ruler or the state’s prerogative?  How does the efficiency of regulatory and 
enforcement agencies limit the efficacy of the law?  What measures can be developed 
that illustrate the understaffing of the courts?     
The Centre for Public Integrity is developing a framework to begin to answer these 
questions.  The “Public Integrity Index” [The Centre (2004)] assesses the institutional 
mechanisms that safeguard against corruption, breaking the data down into three 
categories that measure the existence of anti-corruption mechanisms such as laws and 
courts, the effectiveness of those mechanisms, and the access that citizens have to public 
information to hold their government accountable.  Peer reviewed scorecards assess both 
formal laws and procedures as well as informal “in practice” measures for each subject 
area.56 Researchers still lack data to investigate the empirical link between the judicial 
 
5A complete list of indicators as well as the full methodology for the reports is available at 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/default.aspx?act=10. Appendix I for this paper lists the questions related to the 
judiciary. 
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system and democratisation.  Once quantitative cross country data are available, policy-
makers will have better tools to engineer more accountable governance through legal 
reforms. 
“Public Integrity Index” 
One such tool is given below. 
(Indicators related to judiciary; full list of indicators and methodology available at 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/default.aspx?act=10#4) 
 
III-3 Judiciary 
36 In law, is the independence of the judiciary guaranteed? 
37 Is the appointment process for high court judges effective? 
37a In practice, there is a transparent procedure for selecting high court judges. 
37b In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of 
high court judges. 
37c In law, there is a confirmation process for high court judges (i.e. conducted 
by the legislature or an independent body). 
37d In law, high court judges are protected from removal without relevant 
justification. 
37e In practice, high court judges are protected from political interference. 
38 Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions? 
38a In law, members of the judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their 
decisions. 
38b In practice, members of the judiciary give reasons for their decisions. 
38c In law, there is an ombudsman (or equivalent agency) for the judicial system. 
38d In law, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) is protected from 
political interference. 
38e In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) 
initiates investigations. 
38f In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) 
imposes penalties on offenders. 
39 Can citizens access the judicial system? 
39a In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a 
legal suit. 
39b In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit. 
39c In practice, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases 
who cannot afford it. 
39d In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic 
location. 
40 In law, is there a program to protect witnesses in corruption cases? 
41 Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases? 
41a In practice, in the last year, no high court judges have been physically harmed 
because of adjudicating corruption cases. 
41b In practice, in the last year, no high court judges have been killed because of 
adjudicating corruption cases. 
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